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Abstract. In the present paper I address two significant and prevalent errors concerning 
opposition to natural theology within the Reformed theological tradition. First, contrary to 
Alvin Plantinga, I argue that the idea of properly basic theistic belief has not motivated or 
otherwise grounded opposition to natural theology within the Reformed tradition. There is, 
in fact, a Reformed endorsement of natural theology grounded in the notion that theistic 
belief can be properly basic. Secondly, I argue that late nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
Reformed criticisms of natural theology do not constitute an objection to natural theology 
as such but rather an objection to natural theology construed in a particular way. I explore 
the nature of this objection and its compatibility with an alternative understanding of 
natural theology.
The so-called ‘Reformed objection’ to natural theology has been the 
focal point of a plethora of essays in Anglo-American philosophy of 
religion since the emergence of the Reformed epistemology movement 
spearheaded by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff in the early 
1980s. ‘Natural theology’ in this context refers to the project of developing 
rational arguments for the existence and nature of God. The ‘Reformed 
objection’ refers to opposition to this project associated with the Calvinistic 
or Reformed streams of the Protestant theological tradition. In this paper 
I will revisit the Reformed objection to natural theology.
My primary goal in this paper is to put the Reformed objection to 
natural theology in proper perspective, and this requires correcting two 
significant and long-standing misunderstandings concerning Reformed 
opposition to natural theology. First, contrary to what Alvin Plantinga 
has argued, the thesis of properly basic theistic belief has not motivated 
or otherwise grounded any Reformed objection to natural theology. 
Quite the contrary, I will argue. The idea that human persons have 
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a natural disposition to believe in God in a basic way has actually inspired 
a Reformed endorsement of natural theology—a frequently overlooked 
aspect of the Reformed tradition. Secondly, Reformed criticisms of natural 
theology have typically not targeted the project of natural theology 
as such but rather a certain construal of this project. At any rate, this 
is true of what is arguably the central Reformed objection to natural 
theology, what I will designate the autonomy objection. This objection 
targets natural theology as system of theology entirely separate from or 
independent of dogmatic theology, but I will argue that natural theology 
may be (and has been) otherwise construed and so insulated from the 
autonomy objection. In the latter part of the paper I outline a model of 
natural theology according to which natural theology is a vital element 
within the discourse of dogmatic theology. Consequently, the autonomy 
objection should be viewed as a call to recontextualize natural theology 
as opposed to being a demand that we reject it altogether.
THE REFORMED OBJECTION TO NATURAL THEOLOGY
A. The ‘Reformed Objection’ in Perspective
Since the 1980s it has become increasingly fashionable in Anglo-American 
philosophy of religion to associate the Reformed tradition in general 
with opposition to natural theology, as if the majority of Reformed 
theologians have rejected theistic arguments or such a rejection has been 
the dominant position of the tradition. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff have popularized this idea, but earlier twentieth-century 
thinkers, for example Edgar Sheffield Brightman and Robert Leet 
Patterson, suggested it as well.1
1 See Alvin Plantinga, “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,” Proceedings 
of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 15 (1980): 49-63; Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
“The Reformed Tradition” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Philip Quinn and 
Charles Taliaferro (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 166; Edgar Sheffield Brightman, 
A Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice Hall, 1940), 23–5, 172; Robert Leet Patterson, 
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Holt and Company, 1958), 142.
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Plantinga has written:
Suppose we think of natural theology as the attempt to prove or demonstrate 
the existence of God. This enterprise has a long and impressive history. . . . 
Many Christians, however, have been less than totally impressed. In particular 
Reformed or Calvinistic theologians have for the most part taken a dim view 
of this enterprise. A few Reformed thinkers—B.B. Warfield, for example—
endorse the theistic proofs; but for the most part the Reformed attitude has 
ranged from tepid endorsement, through indifference, to suspicion, hostility, 
and outright accusations of blasphemy.2
Similarly, Nicholas Wolterstorff has said, “Characteristic of the Continental 
Calvinist tradition has been a revulsion against arguments in favor of 
theism or Christianity.”3 Wolterstorff has spoken of the rejection of the 
possibility of natural theology by “the bulk of Reformed theologians”4 
and linked this to the work of contemporary philosophers of religion in 
the Reformed tradition:
One of the most salient features of contemporary philosophy of religion in 
the Reformed tradition of Christianity is its negative attitude toward natural 
theology—this negative attitude ranging all the way from indifference to 
hostility. In this regard, the philosophers of the tradition reflect the dominant 
attitude of the theologians of the tradition, going all the way back to its most 
influential founder, John Calvin.5
It is important to emphasize at the outset that Reformed thought has not 
opposed natural theology to the extent that contemporary philosophers 
of religion have suggested. Up until the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, natural theology was widely endorsed within the Reformed 
2 Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” in Faith and Rationality: Reason and 
Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicolas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1983), 63. A portion of this essay was originally published as “The 
Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical 
Association, 15 (1980): 49–63. Since the 1983 reproduction of this material in “Reason and 
Belief in God” is more widely accessible than the original 1980 article, references and 
quotations will be taken from the 1983 article.
3 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Introduction,” in Faith and Rationality, 7.
4 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Reformed Tradition,” 166.
5 Ibid., 165.
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tradition. Rev. John Platt has carefully delineated the endorsement and 
development of theistic arguments in early Reformed scholasticism, and 
Richard Muller has explained its development from the Reformation 
period through eighteenth-century Reformed scholasticism.6 It is also 
worth noting that several of the major nineteenth-century works on the 
history of natural theology do not describe any Calvinistic or Reformed 
objection to natural theology, though they consider religious objections to 
natural theology in some detail. Calvinists, when mentioned, are depicted 
as supporters of natural theology.7 As a widespread phenomenon in 
the tradition, the Reformed rejection of natural theology appears to be 
a latecomer on the Reformed theological scene. And even here we must 
proceed with caution, as the legitimate lines of dispute, where they exist, 
have typically been drawn around the function of theistic arguments 
not their basic acceptance. As I’ll argue later in this paper, this is true 
even in the viewpoint of the harsher nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
Reformed critics of natural theology.
B. Plantinga’s ‘Reformed Objection’
While contemporary philosophers of religion have exaggerated the extent 
of objections to natural theology in the Reformed tradition, we must 
still recognize that some prominent representatives of the tradition have 
objected to natural theology. Nineteenth-century Dutch neo-Calvinists 
6 Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development 
of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1575, 2nd edition (4 vols, Grand Rapids: Baker Book 
House, 2003), vol. 1, 270–310, vol 3, 153–226; John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: 
the Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575–1650 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1982). See also my Reformed Objection to Natural Theology (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2009), chapter 1.
7 See Alfred Caldecott, The Philosophy of Religion in England and America (London: 
Methuen & Co., 1901), 105–45, 400–415; Thomas Flint, Theism, 7th edition (1877; reprint, 
New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 323–9; E.H. Gillett, God in Human Thought 
(2 vols, New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co., 1874), vol. 2, 422, 468–71, 487–93, 508–16, 
676–79; Lewis Ezra Hicks, Critique of Design-Arguments, A Historical Review and Free 
Examination of the Methods of Reasoning in Natural Theology (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1883), 164–74, 187–95, 243–77, 283–87, 309–30; Bernard Pünjer, History of the Christian 
Philosophy of Religion from the Reformation to Kant, trans. W. Hastie (Edinbugh: T & T 
Clark, 1887), 125–58.
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Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck, for example, were highly critical 
of ‘theistic proofs.’ Reformed criticisms of natural theology have been 
widespread in twentieth-century Reformed thought. Auguste Lecerf, G.C. 
Berkouwer, G.H. Kersten, Karl Barth, William Masselink, and Cornelius 
Van Til are six such prominent critics.
In several articles since 1980 Alvin Plantinga has examined the criti-
cal appraisal of natural theology among three representative Reformed 
theologians: John Calvin, Herman Bavinck, and Karl Barth.8 Plantinga’s 
main conclusion has been that these thinkers rejected natural theology 
primarily because they held that theistic belief is properly basic, that is, 
theistic belief can be rational (and even constitute knowledge) for a person, 
even if the person does not have arguments or evidence for theistic belief, 
indeed, even if no such arguments are available.
In rejecting natural theology, therefore, these Reformed thinkers [Calvin, 
Bavinck, and Barth] mean to say first of all that the propriety or rightness 
of belief in God in no way depends upon the success or availability of the 
sort of theistic arguments that form the natural theologian’s stock in trade. 
I think this is their central claim here, and their central insight.9
Furthermore, according to Plantinga, adhering to the proper basicality of 
theistic belief as these thinkers did, they were led to an inchoate rejection of 
classical foundationalism. Classical foundationalism is the epistemological 
view that all chains of inferentially justified beliefs ultimately terminate in 
properly basic propositions that are self-evident, evident to the senses, or 
incorrigible. Since theistic belief does not satisfy any of these criteria of 
proper basicality, if theistic belief is supposed to be properly basic, classical 
foundationalism must be mistaken. So, as Plantinga sees it, the alleged 
rejection of natural theology by Reformed theologians is closely connected 
to their at least implicit rejection of classical foundationalism.
Plantinga raises three additional points, largely in connection 
with Dutch Calvinist Herman Bavinck. As Plantinga sees it, Bavinck 
8 In addition to “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology” and “Reason and 
Belief in God,” “The Reformed Objection Revisited,” Christian Scholar’s Review, 12 (1983): 
57–61.
9 Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” 72.
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maintained that we cannot come to a knowledge of God’s existence 
by way of arguments because theistic arguments simply do not work. 
Secondly, the Bible does not argue to God’s existence but rather presup-
poses it; therefore, the Christian should start from belief in God rather 
than reason to God’s existence. Or, as Plantinga subsequently states the 
matter, theistic belief ought not to be based on arguments. Finally, belief 
in God is analogous to belief in the existence of the self and the external 
world. We typically do not have, and do not need, arguments for the latter 
kinds of beliefs. We hold them, and properly so, in a basic way. The same 
is true of theistic belief.10
PROPER BASICALITY AND NATURAL THEOLOGY
The first thing to see here is that Plantinga is correct that the Reformed 
tradition has asserted the proper basicality of theistic belief, or at any rate, 
something closely approximating it. Calvin’s sensus divinitatis is plausibly 
interpreted as a non-inferential, spontaneous conviction of the existence 
of God. Bavinck, as Plantinga points out, held that theistic belief does 
not originate with argument, but it is spontaneously formed, just like our 
belief in the self and the external world. Bavinck, though, is following an 
established tradition originating with the Reformers and developed by the 
Reformed scholastics. The latter spoke of the cognitio dei insita, that is, the 
naturally implanted knowledge of God. This knowledge stands in contrast 
to knowledge of God acquired by way of reasoning or inference.
As Louis Berkhof described the cognitio dei insita:
It denotes a knowledge that necessarily results from the constitution of the 
human mind, that is inborn only in the sense that it is acquired spontaneously, 
under the influence of the semen religionis implanted in man by his creation 
in the image of God, and that is not acquired by the laborious process of 
reasoning and argumentation.11
10 See Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” 65, 72.
11 Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 4th edition (1939; reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 1984), 35.
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It is a frequently overlooked fact that Princeton theologians Charles 
Hodge and B.B. Warfield, otherwise known for their endorsement of 
natural theology, held that the existence of God is an intuitive truth, 
not something belief in which originates from argument or a process of 
reasoning.12 William Shedd and Augustus Strong similarly held that we 
know that God exists by means of a rational intuition.13 The awareness 
of God’s existence spontaneously arises in us with our self-knowledge 
and experience of the world. Since this knowledge of God is immediate, 
not the product of inference or argument, it involves theistic beliefs that 
are—in Plantinga’s language—properly basic. So Plantinga is correct 
when he speaks of the Reformed commitment to the proper basicality 
of theistic belief. The above theologians illustrate a widely accepted idea 
within the Reformed tradition.
A. Proper Basicality and the Rejection of Natural Theology
What seems implausible, though, is Plantinga’s idea that the Reformed 
commitment to properly basic theistic belief has motivated or otherwise 
involved a rejection of natural theology. I’ll argue this in a preliminary 
way here and return to it in section III.C.
First, there is the following conceptual point: the proper basicality 
thesis does not entail a denial of the value or usefulness of theistic argu-
ments, so it is exceedingly difficult to see how the proper basicality thesis 
can adequately motivate a rejection of natural theology in point of logic. 
This is true even if we restrict our focus to the epistemic value of such 
arguments. The proper basicality thesis, at least in its standard form, states 
that some theistic beliefs can have some (perhaps highly exalted) positive 
epistemic status for some people under certain conditions in the absence of 
natural theology. This is properly speaking a denial of certain strong forms 
12 Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (3 vols, n.d.; reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1982), vol. 1, 191–203; B.B. Warfield, “God,” in Studies in Theology, 
vol. 9 of The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield (10 vols, 1932; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker 
Book House, 2000), 110.
13 William Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 2nd edition (3 vols, 1888; reprint, Nashville: 
Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1980), vol. 1, 195–220; Augustus Strong, Systematic Theology 
(1907; reprint, Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1979), 52–70.
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of theistic evidentialism, not natural theology. The project of developing 
theistic arguments, and the belief that such arguments are epistemically 
efficacious, must be distinguished from the epistemological view that 
there can be no knowledge of God without such arguments. Of course, 
natural theology might still be necessary in a more restricted sense. For 
example, natural theology might be necessary for people to be warranted 
in particular kinds of theistic beliefs, for example, of a theoretically robust 
sort. Or natural theology might be necessary for warranted theistic belief 
for some people under highly specific circumstances, for example, where 
people have acquired a defeater for theistic belief.14 Moreover, theistic 
arguments may be useful to Christian apologetics for the purpose of 
showing that theism is true, however such arguments are implicated in 
the theist’s knowledge of God.
Of course, Plantinga also says that according to theologians such as 
Bavinck belief in God ought not to be based on argument.
In fact, they [Calvin, Kuyper, Bavinck, and Barth] think that the Christian 
ought not to accept belief in God on the basis of argument; to do so is to 
run the risk of a faith that is unstable and wavering. . . .The correct or proper 
way to believe in God, they thought, was not on the basis of arguments from 
natural theology or anywhere else; the correct way is to take belief in God 
as properly basic.15
This is a stronger claim than the standard proper basicality thesis. How 
should we understand it? I think the protest here is against inference being 
the exclusive source of belief in God. Or more precisely stated, a cognizer 
whose relevant cognitive faculties are functioning properly does not come 
to believe in God solely on the basis of argument, and for such a person 
belief in God will not be sustained solely by argument. We need only 
slightly adjust this to leave more room for natural theology. A believer who 
reflects sufficiently on the matter may derive more robust sorts of theistic 
beliefs by way of logical inference, for example, belief in divine simplicity 
or God’s timelessness. These beliefs will depend on argument, perhaps 
14 On defeaters and natural theology, see my Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, 
88–92.
15 Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” 72.
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exclusively so. I do not think that Bavinck in particular or the Reformed 
tradition in general is claiming that there is something improper about 
this. The believer may very well need arguments for these kinds of theistic 
beliefs. The idea here rather is that belief in God simpliciter ought not to 
be exclusively grounded in argument.
Secondly, Reformed theologians have in fact recognized inference 
as a source of natural knowledge of God. Following Reformers such as 
Philip Melanchthon, Martin Bucer, Peter Martyr Vermigli, and John 
Calvin, Reformed orthodoxy has distinguished between knowledge 
of God that is naturally implanted in the human person (cognitio dei 
insita) and knowledge of God that is acquired by rational inference from 
observational features of the world, such as its order and beauty (cognitio 
dei acquisita).16 Francis Turretin wrote: “The orthodox. . .uniformly teach 
that there is a natural theology, partly innate (derived from the book of 
conscience by means of common notions) and partly acquired (drawn 
from the book of creatures discursively).”17 According to this model, the 
natural knowledge of God—generally speaking—is not exclusively im-
mediate, nor exclusively inferential. Theistic inferences operate in tandem 
with immediate knowledge of God. We might even say that the former 
confirms and supplements the latter. We are also not committed to sup-
posing that we first come to believe in God by way of inference.
Consider the testimony of four Calvinists at this juncture. Charles 
Hodge, optimistic as he was about theistic arguments, did not see such 
arguments as the origin of belief in God. After affirming that the existence 
of God is an intuitive truth, Hodge says: “We do not thus reason ourselves 
into the belief that there is a God; and it is very obvious that it is not by 
such a process of ratiocination, simple as it is, that the mass of people 
are brought to this conclusion.”18 Theistic proofs are the product of “the 
method by which that [intuitive] belief is confirmed and developed.”19 
16 On the distinction between the cognitio dei insita and cognitio dei acquisita, see 
Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, trans. G.M. Giger (3 vols, Phillipsburg: P&R 
Publishing, 1992), 1.2.7, 1.3.1–6; Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, trans. J. Vriend (2 vols, Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003–2004), vol. 2, 59–76; Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 35–6.
17 Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1.3.4.
18 Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 200.
19 Ibid.
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William Shedd said that theistic arguments “assist the development of the 
idea of God, and contain a scientific analysis of man’s natural conscious-
ness of the deity.”20 Similarly, B.B. Warfield, “This immediate perception 
of God is confirmed and the contents of this idea developed by a series 
of arguments known as ‘theistic proofs.’”21 Finally, Calvinistic Baptist 
Augustus Strong wrote, “Although the knowledge of God’s existence is 
intuitive, it may be explicated and confirmed by arguments drawn from 
the actual universe and from the abstract ideas of the human mind.”22
Herman Bavinck held a similar view. Although he acknowledged 
a cognitio dei insita, he also maintained a cognitio dei acquisita. As Bavinck 
sees it, God reveals Himself to human consciousness in an intuitive man-
ner by way of the cognitio dei insita.
In the case of the acquired knowledge of God, human beings reflect upon 
that revelation of God. Their minds go to work, thought processes are set in 
motion, and with clear heads they seek by reasoning and proof to rise from 
the observation of creatures to [the reality] of God. The fact is, humans are 
not content with impressions and intuitions in any area of knowledge. . . They 
desire to explain the how and why of their knowledge. Common everyday 
empirical knowledge is always driven to achieve true, scientific, knowledge. 
That is also why faith aspires to become theology, and the innate knowledge 
of God seeks to complete itself in the acquired knowledge of God.23
Bavinck and these other Reformed theologians are representative of 
Reformed thought at this juncture. Commitment to immediate knowledge 
of God does not motivate the rejection of theistic arguments. Quite the 
contrary: theistic arguments are typically taken to represent the reflective 
elaboration of a more primitive, spontaneous knowledge of God, and the 
human impulse towards reflective knowledge is itself as natural as the 
impulse to believe in God. Natural theology is therefore a consequence 
of our constitution as human persons.
20 Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, vol. 1, 221.
21 B.B. Warfield, “God,” 110.
22 Strong, Systematic Theology, 71.
23 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 2, 74.
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B. The Reformed Endorsement of Natural Theology
The Reformed account of the natural knowledge of God confronts us 
squarely with an endorsement of the project of natural theology. The above 
Reformed theologians, including Bavinck, accept the project of developing 
theistic arguments. In this they are representative of the tradition as 
a whole. Bavinck confirms this in saying, “natural theology is upheld in 
its truth and value by all Reformed theologians.”24 Again, “Reformed 
theologians from the very beginning adopted a friendlier posture toward 
natural theology.”25 What is initially surprising here is that a critic of 
natural theology takes this position.
What, then, of Plantinga’s claim that Bavinck thinks that theistic 
arguments don’t work? “. . .[W]e cannot come to knowledge of God 
on the basis of argument; the arguments of natural theology just do not 
work.”26 There is a sense in which Plantinga is correct. Late nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century Reformed theologians have often been skeptical 
of theistic arguments as ostensible ‘proofs’ or ‘logical demonstrations,’ 
that is, as rationally compelling arguments for the existence of God. The 
arguments don’t work in this respect. (Of course several of the leading 
natural theologians of our day would agree with this assessment of natural 
theology.)27 Bavinck was explicit about the failure of theistic arguments 
as purported logical demonstrations,28 but at the same time he main-
tained that these arguments are effective in other respects. First, they are 
stronger than arguments against the existence of God. As such they are 
apologetically relevant and useful.29 Moreover, although weak as proofs, 
these arguments are strong as “‘signs and testimonies’ that never fail to 
make an impression on everyone’s mind.”30 What Bavinck means to say 
here, I think, is that theistic arguments involve evidences that confirm the 
intuitive perception of God and are instrumental in developing this basic 
24 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, 87.
25 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 2, 66.
26 Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” 65.
27 For example, Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2004), 4–22, 136–37, 155, 329–30.
28 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 2, 89–91.
29 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 59; cf. 91.
30 Ibid., vol. 2, 91.
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knowledge. For Christians in particular theistic arguments confirm and 
clarify their own religious consciousness and allow them to systematically 
reflect on the revelation of God in nature.
For Christians these proofs signify that it is one and the same God who 
manifests himself in nature and in grace. . . .Collectively, the testimonies 
that God sends us in the world and are condensed in the so-called proofs 
are nothing other than a revelation of the name of the Lord by means of 
which he makes himself known to his creatures and gives us the right to 
address him.31
Bavinck is not alone in this regard. Several prominent twentieth-century 
Reformed critics of natural theology affirm the value of theistic arguments 
as testimonies or evidences—not logical demonstrations—of the existence 
of God. As such, they are sufficient to rebut atheism and instrumental in 
confirming and developing the Christian’s knowledge of God.
Concerning theistic arguments, Berkhof wrote:
They are important as interpretations of God’s general revelation and as 
exhibiting the reasonableness of belief in a divine being. Moreover, they can 
render some service in meeting the adversary. While they do not prove the 
existence of God beyond possibility of doubt, so as to compel assent, they 
can be so constructed as to establish a strong probability and thereby silence 
many unbelievers.32
William Masselink argued that belief in God is not based on theistic 
arguments, either for the believer or unbeliever. The knowledge of God’s 
existence comes to humans through the general witness of the Holy Spirit 
who makes the evidences of God in creation efficacious testimonies. But 
there is no process of logical inference at this level. Yet, Masselink still 
asserted the positive value of theistic arguments. “By means of these 
‘theistic proofs’ it is not difficult to show the atheist not only the weak 
points of his system, but the hollow emptiness of his whole philosophy.”33 
Moreover, since all people are endowed with an innate idea of God, the 
31 Ibid., vol. 2, 91.
32 Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 28.
33 Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1953), 119.
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theistic arguments can also be used as “a stimulus to bring back God-
consciousness to the natural man. If the soul of the natural man then reacts 
to this stimulation, it can be a means to reawaken this God-consciousness 
within him.”34 Finally, Masselink says that theistic arguments “strengthen 
the faith” and enable the believer to “come to a closer knowledge of God.”35
According to G.H. Kersten, theistic arguments cannot prove the 
existence of God, especially not to unbelievers since “those who willfully 
suppress the conviction that God exists will not be convinced by any 
argument.”36 However, these arguments are “not altogether worthless” if 
taken as testimonies. Kersten contends that theistic arguments can be of 
service simply to “entangle the atheist in his own statements.”37 He says 
that theistic arguments “are testimonies that exceed in power the denial of 
the atheist.”38 Similarly, Auguste Lecerf affirmed the apologetic usefulness 
of theistic arguments. According to Lecerf, since faith seeks understand-
ing, faith has an internal tendency to answer objections that might be 
urged against it. This is important not merely to fortify believers but also 
to be used by God as instruments in the conversion of the elect.
Apologetics does not endeavour to destroy the adversary’s disposition to 
attack merely in order to comfort the believer; but, by the intellectual defence 
of religious truth which it presents, it seeks to become an instrument in God’s 
hands, a means of grace, that shall produce in the opponent himself a deep 
and favourable impression of the truth of religious doctrine.39
Neither Bavinck nor his Reformed company here denies the value of 
theistic arguments, not even their epistemic efficacy.40 And this seems 
34 Ibid., 119.
35 Ibid., 120.
36 G.H. Kersten, Reformed Dogmatics: A Systematic Treatment of Reformed Doctrine 
(2 vols, 1980; reprint, Netherlands Reformed Book and Publishing Committee, 1981), 
vol. 1, 37.
37 Ibid., 41.
38 Ibid., p. 42.
39 Auguste Lecerf, An Introduction to Reformed Dogmatics (London: Lutterworth Press, 
1949), 208.
40 Plantinga himself, while he expresses skepticism about theistic arguments being 
logical demonstrations, maintains that there are nonetheless good theistic arguments, and he 
asserts the usefulness of such arguments for various purposes, including confirming theistic 
50 michaEl sudduTh
entirely right. We have a good deal of inferentially warranted beliefs and 
inferential knowledge based on arguments that fall short of being logical 
demonstrations. The same epistemic opportunities should apply to theistic 
belief. So we cannot infer that theistic arguments cannot be a source of 
positive epistemic status for theistic belief simply because such arguments 
do not work as logical demonstrations.
THE AUTONOMY OBJECTION
Seeing as Bavinck and these other Reformed critics of natural theology 
do not reject theistic arguments as such, in what sense do they object to 
natural theology? To be sure, they have a logical objection to theistic 
arguments. They believe such arguments fail as logical demonstrations. 
But is there more to their discontent with natural theology? Yes, but here 
is where we need an evaluation very different than the one Plantinga has 
provided.
A. Natural Theology as a Separate and Foundational Theology
In his Principles of Sacred Theology (1898) Abraham Kuyper expressed the 
following criticism of natural theology.
If at first the Reformation fostered more accurate ideas [about natural theol-
ogy], soon the temptation appeared too strong, to place natural theology as 
a separate theology alongside of special theology (theologia specialis). . . .With 
this division it became apparent that the real Theology as knowledge of God 
gave the lion’s share to natural theology. . . .This furnished natural theology 
the occasion to unfold its wings even more broadly; to expand itself and 
lessen the importance of special theology; until finally it has succeeded in 
stepping forth as a monarch and in contesting all right of utterance to special 
theology. . . .It is, therefore, of the greatest importance, to see clearly, that 
belief and helping some people move from unbelief to belief. See Plantinga, “Reason and 
Belief in God,” 73; “The Prospects for Natural Theology,” in Philosophical Perspectives 5: 
Philosophy of Religion, ed. James Tomberlin (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1991); 
and “Two Dozen (or So) Theistic Arguments” in Alvin Plantinga, ed. Deane-Peter Baker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 203–27.
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special theology may not be considered a moment without natural theology, 
and that on the other hand natural theology of itself is unable to supply any 
pure knowledge of God.41
Kuyper does not here object to the project of developing theistic argu-
ments. In fact, elsewhere he explicitly endorses such arguments.42 He is 
also quite explicit that special or scriptural theology cannot do without 
natural theology. The former presupposes the latter, as grace presupposes 
nature. The focus of the criticism is the construction of a theology separate 
from the theology based on Scripture. As Kuyper sees it, natural theol-
ogy historically evolved into an independent theology that usurped the 
authority of Scripture and ultimately undercut the notion of scriptural 
theology. Without the revelation of God in Scripture, though, theology 
is unable to supply any pure knowledge of God, for such a theology must 
always view God from the perspective of fallen human reason. Kuyper 
takes the noetic effects of sin to be significant enough to undermine the 
reliability of human reasoning about God, that is, in the absence of the 
light given by Scripture.
Natural theology can exhibit itself as a regnant power only when human 
nature receives the beams of its light in their purity and reflects them equally 
completely. At present, however, the glass has been impaired by a hundred 
cracks, and the receiving and the reflecting have become unequal, and the 
image that was to reflect itself is hindered in its clear reflection and thereby 
rendered untrue. And for this reason you cannot depend on natural theology 
as it works in fallen man; and its imperfect lines and forms bring you, through 
the broken image, in touch with the reality of the infinite, only when an 
accidens enables you to recover this defective ideal for yourself, and natural 
theology receives this accidens only in special revelation. . . .43
Bavinck expressed similar concerns:
Now the Reformation indeed adopted this natural theology along with its 
proofs but, instead of treating it prior to the doctrine of faith, incorporated it 
41 Abraham Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, trans. J. Hendrik De Vries (1898; 
reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1980), 372–73.
42 Ibid., 243, 300, 302.
43 Ibid., 307.
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in the doctrine of faith. . . . Soon, however, Protestant theology started taking 
the road of rationalism. Whereas natural theology was initially an account, 
in the light of Scripture, of what Christians can know concerning God 
from creation, it soon became an exposition of what nonbelieving rational 
persons could learn from nature by the power of their own reasoning. . . 
.Natural theology became the real, the scientific and demonstrable theology 
by which revealed theology was increasingly marginalized and driven from 
the field.44
Like Kuyper, Bavinck’s target here is natural theology as a system of 
theology developed in isolation from the content of Scripture. Bavinck 
is reacting to the actual evolution of natural theology in the history of 
Protestant dogmatics. As he sees it, natural theology as an independent 
theology supplemented by revealed theology quickly becomes an in-
dependent competitor to revealed theology. It ends up—as in English 
deism and German rationalism—thinking of itself as completely adequate 
and revealed theology as unnecessary.45 Bavinck too operates on the as-
sumption that reason, without the assistance of Scripture, is incapable 
of properly reflecting on general revelation. Consequently, any theology 
based solely on general revelation will involve a fundamentally distorted 
view of God.
These concerns have been widespread in twentieth-century Calvinism. 
Speaking of the various treatises on natural theology composed by 
Reformed thinkers under the influence of Cartesianism, Auguste Lecerf 
said, “Natural theology is considered in them as an autonomous discipline, 
constituted solely by the resources of the light of nature and leading to the 
living God, the author of positive revelation. The function of revelation 
begins, once this truth has been acquired.”46 Lecerf disapproves and adds, 
“Knowledge of God acquired by the spectacle of the universe, by the effect 
of reflection, if it is deprived of the help of positive revelation, is equally 
incapable of leading us to a correct theology.”47 Kersten wrote, “Those 
who separate the natural knowledge of God from the special revelation 
44 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 2, 78.
45 See Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, 288, 306–20, 513.
46 Lecerf, An Introduction to Reformed Dogmatics, 22.
47 Ibid., 108.
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in Scripture are wrong when they see a separate entity in the ‘theologia 
naturalis.’”48
We see at this juncture a certain confluence of thought between these 
Calvinists and Karl Barth, for one of Karl Barth’s objections to natural 
theology stemmed from the allegedly distorted view of God that results 
from creating an autonomous sphere of knowledge of God as creator that 
is wholly uninformed by the biblical doctrine of God.
It is. . .hard to see how what is distinctive for this God can be made clear if, 
as has constantly happened in Roman Catholic and Protestant dogmatics 
both old and new, the question of who God is, which it is the business of the 
doctrine of the Trinity to answer, is held in reserve, and the first question to 
be treated is that of the That and the What of God, as though these could 
be defined otherwise than on the presupposition of the Who.49
In his General Revelation, G.C. Berkouwer also associated this sort of 
natural theology with Roman Catholicism. In a chapter devoted to 
a critique of the ‘natural theology of Rome,’ Berkouwer says:
The question now arises how and how far God is known in this way [through 
natural theology]. We have already seen that this knowledge cannot be 
adequate because it proceeds through the medium of created reality and 
is also characterized by it. So, for example, one cannot by means of natural 
knowledge know that God is triune. The mysteries are entirely hidden from 
such knowledge. It is apparent therefore, that this is not simply an inadequate 
knowledge, but that one must really speak of a partial knowledge, even 
in an extremely dualistic way. By means of natural knowledge one knows 
only that part or “aspect” of God which is mediated through creation and 
relates especially to his being. The results of the theistic proofs demonstrate 
this. By means of these proofs reason comes to recognize the existence of 
a self-existent being. . . . Here the knowledge relation between Creator and 
creature is ontologically fixed. It results in knowledge of the formal aspects of 
48 G.H. Kersten, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, 5.
49 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F Torrence (4 vols, 
Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1936–1975), vol. 1. pt., 1, pp. 300–301. T.F. Torrance and Alister 
McGrath each argues that Barth’s objection to natural theology was fundamentally the 
autonomy objection. See Torrance, “The Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought of 
Karl Barth,” Religious Studies 6 (1970): 121–35; and McGrath, A Scientific Theology (Grand 
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), 267–86.
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God’s being, in an independent natural theology of the first article (God as 
Creator) which has nothing to do with the knowledge of God in the reality 
of his grace and mercy. . . .It is almost inconceivable that the Roman Catholic 
Church has not been repeatedly shocked by this empty, abstract, and formal 
God-concept of her natural theology. . . . At this point Roman Catholic 
theology has never been able to give a satisfactory answer to Reformed 
critique. In this formal and empty God-concept we see the heart of Rome’s 
natural theology. 50
Berkouwer, like Barth but unlike most of the other Reformed thinkers 
mentioned above, has no place for theistic arguments at all, except as 
testimonies to the degenerated status of the natural knowledge of God. 
However, it is clear that he rejects theistic arguments precisely because 
he equates the project of developing such arguments with the creation 
of a purely rational system of theology that is unable to present God as 
He is in the totality of his revelation to creatures. Focusing solely on one 
aspect of the divine being reached by the intellect alone, the idea of God 
in natural theology becomes an intellectual idol.
What underlies the above critique of natural theology, then, are 
suspicions about natural theology as an autonomous theological system 
divorced from the content of special revelation. Such a system of theology 
is bound to be defective either because it involves a distorted knowledge 
of God as creator or excludes the knowledge of God as redeemer. The 
concern here is not merely a concern about systems of pagan natural theol-
ogy, but even ostensibly Christian dogmatic theology that is erected on 
purely rational foundations. When approached independently of scriptural 
revelation, general revelation is bound to yield a theologically inadequate 
doctrine of God and His relation to created beings. Consequently, as 
Louis Berkhof aptly put it, the Reformers “did not believe in the ability 
of human reason to construct a scientific system of theology on the basis 
of natural revelation pure and simple.”51
50 Berkouwer, General Revelation (1955; reprint, Grand Rapids: Wm. B Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1979), 69, 72–73.
51 Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 38.
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B. Pre-Dogmatic Foundations Model of Natural Theology
It is important to see the above criticisms of natural theology as 
a reaction to a conception of natural theology that evolved out of the 
Enlightenment. The influence of Cartesianism on Protestant theology 
in the seventeenth century contributed to an expansion of the role of 
reason in theology.52 Natural theology became an autonomous system 
of rational theology that was intended as a pre-dogmatic foundation 
for the Christian faith. For example, Jean-Alphonse Turretin presented 
natural theology as a system of purely rational truths accessible to reason 
apart from any supernatural revelation.53 For Salomon van Til, natural 
theology was a prolegomenon in which a purely rational discourse on 
the divine existence and attributes, separated from Scripture, prepared 
the way for the system of revealed theology.54 The idea of a distinct 
rational-theological locus upon which the biblical doctrine of God 
could be based further evolved during the eighteenth century under the 
influence of Christian Wolff and Wolffian rationalism.55 In the works of 
Johann Friedrich Stapfer and Daniel Wyttenbach, a detailed discussion 
of the existence and attributes of God constitutes the first port of entry 
to the doctrine of God, only subsequently followed by a discussion of 
Scripture and the Christian doctrine of God.56 In England, the Protestant 
response to Deism led many to erect a supernatural theology on the 
basis of a limited natural religion that encompassed the existence and 
attributes of God, as well as a range of moral duties accessible to reason, 
52 On the modern transformation of natural theology in Catholicism, see G. de Broglie, 
“La vraie notion thomiste des ‘preambula fidei,’” Gregorianum 34 (1953): 341–89. On shifts 
in Protestant orthodoxy, see Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, 87–9, 104–108, 183–92, 
287–89, 512–17, and Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 3, 138, 150, 193–95.
53 See Martin I. Klauber, Between Reformed Scholasticism and Pan-Protestantism: Jean-
Alphonse Turretin (1671-1737) and the Enlightened Orthodoxy at the Academy of Geneva 
(Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1994), chapter 3.
54 Salomon van Til, Theologiae utriusque compendium (Leiden, 1704, 1719), I.i-iii, II.i-iii.
55 See Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, 82–4, 174–76, 305–308, 
396–98; vol. 3, pp. 121–29, 141–50, 193–95.
56 Johann Friedrich Stapfer, Institutiones theologiae polemicae universae, ordine scientifico 
dispositae, 4th ed. (5 vols, Zurich, 1756–57), and Daniel Wyttenbach, Tentamen theologiae 
dogmaticae methodo scientifico pertractatae (3 vols, Frankfurt, 1747–1749).
56 michaEl sudduTh
as is illustrated in Richard Fiddes’s Theologia Speculativa (1718) and Joseph 
Butler’s Analogy of Religion (1736).
Bavinck nicely summarizes this intrusion of rationalism into Reformed 
thought:
The conviction took hold that human reason, even apart from faith, could 
of itself produce all the truths of natural theology. Thus, natural theology, as 
the preamble of faith, became antecedent to revealed theology, and reason 
was emancipated from faith and revelation. Revelation and reason became 
independent entities standing side by side.... Natural theology was believed 
to provide a solid ground on which to stand, a purely scientific foundation, 
and revelation too was examined this way. 57
The nineteenth century would inherit this pre-dogmatic conception of 
natural theology, adjusted in various ways to counter the Kantian and 
Darwinian critique of traditional cosmological and design arguments. 
This arguably reached its culmination in the famous Gifford Lectures 
established by Lord Gifford in 1888. Gifford’s goal was to provide a plat-
form for a purely scientific or rational treatment of the existence and 
nature of God, independent of any claims originating from an ostensible 
divine revelation. When late nineteenth and twentieth-century Reformed 
theologians objected to natural theology it is clear that most of them had 
this conception of natural theology in mind.
C. Returning to Plantinga
Earlier I had argued that Plantinga was mistaken to suppose that 
Reformed theologians such as Herman Bavinck rejected natural theology 
because they held that theistic belief is properly basic. We can now see 
another reason why Plantinga’s diagnosis is mistaken. The central theme 
of Plantinga’s analysis is the proper basicality thesis, namely the idea that 
theistic belief can have some positive epistemic status (e.g., rationality, 
knowledge) even in the absence of theistic arguments. But this is entirely 
compatible with the idea of an autonomous system of natural theology 
being the pre-dogmatic foundation for revealed theology. We have already 
57 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, 105. See also Kersten, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, 41.
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noted that the proper basicality thesis is compatible with the project of 
natural theology, but it is also compatible with viewing this project as an 
autonomous science that provides the rational foundations for revealed 
theology. The pre-dogmatic conception of natural theology may give the 
impression that proofs are preconditions for belief, but this is only an 
impression. One can affirm that, as far as personal belief goes, a person 
can be entirely reasonable in accepting God’s existence in a basic way, 
even know that God exists in this way. The issue is really the proper 
logical starting point of theology, not the proper doxastic starting point 
for the individual believer. So the proper basicality thesis cannot be at 
the center of the Reformed objection to natural theology.
THE DOGMATIC MODEL OF NATURAL THEOLOGY
The autonomy objection is, I think, the central Reformed objection to 
natural theology. However, this objection clearly targets natural theology 
construed in a particular way. In contrast to the autonomous, pre-dogmatic 
conception of natural theology, there is what I will designate the dogmatic 
model of natural theology.58 Roughly stated, according to this model of 
natural theology, theistic arguments represent a rational exploration and 
development of the content of natural revelation, but where this activity 
is situated in the context of dogmatic theology and thus guided by the 
data of scriptural revelation. Here natural theology would be part of 
the discourse of dogmatic theology not a preface to it. This was very 
much the way natural theology was originally conceived within the 
Reformed tradition.
A. The Role of Theistic Arguments in Dogmatic Theology
Theistic arguments made their first explicit appearance in Protestant 
theology in Philip Melanchthon’s works. In his Commentary on Romans, 
58 I have borrowed the designation ‘dogmatic model’ from Richard Muller. See Muller, 
“The Dogmatic Function of St. Thomas’ Proofs: A Protestant Appreciation”, Fides et 
Historia 24:2 (summer 1992): 15-29.
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theistic arguments appear as an elaboration and development of Romans 
1:19–20. In his Loci Communes they appear under the heading de creatione, 
a biblically based discussion of creation. In each case, it is clear that 
theistic arguments are directed to the Christian as a means of rationally 
reflecting on the data of biblical revelation. They represent a scripturally 
informed meditation on natural revelation, not an attempt to lay rational 
foundations for faith. Melanchthon develops theistic arguments in the 
course of articulating aspects of revealed theology, with the stated goal of 
strengthening the Christian’s knowledge of God.59 They are presented as 
Christian meditation on “the footprints of God in the nature of things.”60 
Melanchthon says that God wants us to consider these testimonies since 
“it is useful for strengthening good opinions to hold fast to the true reason-
ings fixed in the mind, which testify that God is the founder and preserver 
of things.”61 There is no attempt here to construct a theology of God 
based solely on reason.
In sixteenth and many seventeenth-century Protestant dogmatic 
systems theistic arguments were typically presented under theological 
prolegomena or the locus de Deo.62 In these systems, though, neither 
theological prolegomena nor the locus de Deo was pre-dogmatic in nature. 
Both exhibit a dependence on and integration with Scripture and the 
correlated Christian doctrine of God, even where the dogmatic system 
begins with the locus de Deo. This explains the reliance on Scripture in the 
locus de Deo, as is illustrated in the use of the “divine names” as a point 
of departure for articulating and systematizing the divine attributes.63 It 
also explains the inclusion of the doctrine of the Trinity under the locus 
de Deo, for example in Andreas Hyperius, Wolfgang Musculus, Lambert 
59 For a detailed discussion of natural theology in Melanchthon and Melanchthon’s 
influence on subsequent Reformed dogmatics, see Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism, 
chapter two.
60 Philip Melanchthon, Commentary on Romans, trans. F. Kramer (Saint Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 77.
61 Ibid.
62 For a detailed discussion of theistic proofs in Reformed scholasticism, see Muller, 
Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 3, 48–52, 153–95.
63 See Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 3, 254–72.
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Daneau, and Francis Turretin.64 In some instances the locus de scriptura 
is prior to the locus de Deo so it is clear that the doctrine of God rests 
on scriptural revelation as its foundation, not reason. We find this, for 
example, in Amandus Polanus, Edward Leigh, and Francis Turretin.65 
Not surprisingly, we find no independent locus on natural theology, either 
within or prefaced to the theological system.
So, on the dogmatic view, natural theology is a dogmatically situated 
rational reflection on the Christian God as manifested in the works of 
creation and providence. One of the crucial functions of natural theol-
ogy on this view is to assist in the enlargement and deepening of the 
Christian’s knowledge of God specifically by reflecting on the content 
of natural revelation. Of course, such a function does not exclude the 
apologetic use of theistic arguments. Such a use was frequent among 
Reformed theologians of the early and high scholastic periods. In this 
context, though, theistic arguments would not be used to establish either 
theism or the Christian faith but simply to refute atheists and remove 
objections to the faith within the larger logical architecture of revealed 
theology. Francis Turretin and Edward Leigh, for example, used the proofs 
to refute atheists, but these arguments appear subsequent to the doctrine 
of Scripture under a biblically informed doctrine of God. This is, of course, 
entirely consistent with the instrumental use of reason in theology. There is 
a reasoned defense of the faith but no apologetically motivated theological 
prolegomenon in which natural theology is used to lay the foundations 
for subsequent claims about God derived from Scripture.
A dogmatic conception of natural theology also introduces the possi-
bility of viewing theistic arguments as a way of justifying the instrumental 
role of reason within dogmatic theology.66 From this vantage point, we can 
see theistic arguments as a way of exploring the nature of our knowledge 
of God and the possibility of a theological discourse in which there is 
a reasoned exploration and elucidation of the articles of faith. The proofs 
64 See Hyperius, Methodus theologiae (1568); Musculus, Loci communes (1560); Daneau, 
Christianae isogoges (1583); Turretin, Institutio theologiae elencticae (1679-85).
65 For example, Polanus, Syntagma theologiae christianae (Geneva, 1617), Leigh, Body of 
Divinity (London, 1654), and Turretin, Institutio theologiae elencticae (Geneva, 1679-85). 
66 See Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 3, 153-9; Muller, “The 
Dogmatic Function of St. Thomas’ Proofs.”
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provide reason to believe that reason itself can enter into the theological 
realm and elucidate the articles of faith. There is no need to establish 
the existence of God within the framework of the dogmatic system. 
Dogmatics presupposes the existence of God. There is a need, however, 
to establish the instrumental validity of reason for theology, to show that 
reason is fit for the task of being the handmaiden of sacred doctrine. On 
this view, while theistic arguments are intended as genuine arguments for 
the existence and nature of God, they are not foundations upon which 
revealed theology is built. They provide the Christian with a justification 
of the instrumental role of reason for the sake of the dogmatic elaboration 
of the articles of faith.
B. Natural Theology Guided by Scripture
According to the dogmatic model of natural theology, natural theological 
reasoning is situated within the context of scriptural revelation. It is 
important to emphasize that some of the Reformed critics of natural 
theology have explicitly endorsed this kind of natural theology, in addition 
to the apologetic function of theistic arguments.
Consider the following statement from Bavinck:
The Reformers indeed assumed a revelation of God in nature. But the hu-
man mind was so darkened by sin that human beings could not rightly 
know and understand this revelation. . . . Objectively needed by human 
beings to understand the general revelation of God in nature was the special 
revelation of God in Holy Scripture, which, accordingly, was compared by 
Calvin to glasses. . . . Hence in the Reformation, natural theology lost its 
rational autonomy. It was no longer treated separately but incorporated in 
the doctrine of the Christian faith.67
How does Scripture guide natural theology? Fundamentally by providing 
a robust doctrine of God that will function as the framework for rational 
inquiry into the evidences for the being and attributes of God from 
created things. There are at least two closely related, complementary ways 
this framework can interact with natural theological reasoning.
67 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, 304-305.
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First, the biblical concept of God can function as the conceptual start-
ing point of natural theology. Suppose one begins with the biblical view 
of God as an almighty, eternal spirit, perfect in goodness and knowledge, 
and creator and sustainer of all things. Given this biblical concept of God, 
one could move on to consider the extent to which the existence of this 
being is a cogent conclusion from various a posteriori and a priori starting 
points of argumentation. In other words, one could begin natural theology 
with a clear concept of God derived from scripture and seek from there 
to prove on rational grounds that such a being exists, rather than let the 
concept of God emerge as a consequence of the reasoning of the theistic 
proofs. This is one way in which the Christian construction of theistic 
arguments might presuppose the biblical view of God, while at the same 
time taking seriously the logical work of constructing cogent arguments 
for the existence and nature of such a being. Of course, beginning with 
the biblical doctrine of God also directs our attention to the creative and 
providential acts of God as He is revealed in Scripture. It therefore allows 
us to see the universe and its fundamental features—the starting point 
of the empirical theistic arguments—as the product of the creative act of 
the triune God of redemption.
Secondly, by providing a biblical concept of God, Scripture provides 
a background system of theological belief relevant to the derivation of 
defeaters to our natural theological reasoning. Here Scripture provides 
a negative constraint on natural theological arguments, a kind of ‘veto 
power’ over natural theological reasoning. While this may be used to 
identify faulty premises, it can more importantly help identify false 
conclusions about the nature of God. Aristotle reasoned to the existence 
of a single supreme being limited in knowledge and power, and wholly 
unconcerned with human affairs. Epicurean natural theology in ancient 
Greece and deistic natural theology in modern philosophy both arrived at 
conclusions inconsistent with the immanence of God and his providential 
control of the world. Stoic natural theology could justify the immanence 
and providence of God but only by adopting a principle of an organic 
continuum that entailed the identity of God and creation. A biblical 
theology of God leads us in a different direction. According to Scripture, 
God exercises providential care over the details of the Universe. Unlike 
Aristotle’s unmoved mover or the many gods of Greek religion, the God 
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of the Bible is not finite in knowledge and power. But neither does God’s 
infinite perfection make him identical to the universe. Scripture presents 
us with a clear ontological distinction between the creator and creation. 
God’s immanence is not purchased at the price of His transcendence. 
While natural theology uncontrolled by biblical revelation has often 
resulted in a concept of God incompatible with the Christian concept of 
God, reason controlled by the deliverances of scripture can more consist-
ently arrive at claims about God that are compatible with the biblical 
doctrine of God.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have addressed two significant misunderstandings of what 
Plantinga and others have designated the ‘Reformed objection’ to natural 
theology. First, there is no connection between the Reformed endorsement 
of properly basic theistic belief and Reformed opposition to natural theol-
ogy. The crucial issue for nineteenth- and twentieth-century Reformed 
critics of natural theology has been the purported autonomy of natural 
theology, that is, its allegedly constituting a theology of God independent 
of dogmatic theology and functioning as a rational preamble to dogmatics. 
Secondly, once we are clear about the real Reformed objection to natural 
theology, it is apparent that it does not involve an unqualified rejection 
of the project of developing theistic arguments. Natural theology may be 
pursued as a dogmatically situated activity of rational reflection on the 
Christian God as manifested in the works of creation and providence. 
While this view of natural theology permits an apologetic deployment of 
theistic arguments, its primary goal is to enlarge the Christian’s knowledge 
of God and justify the instrumental role of reason within the system of 
dogmatic theology.
